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Most observers of international investment transactions agree that
foreign direct investment played an important rale in the external
relations of the industrial countries, especially since the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning ofthe twentieth century. Itwas with the
growth of large man:ufacturing enterprises during that period that
foreign investment, as a new form of technology transfer gradually
replacing trade and migration as chief technology transmission vehic-
les, came into existence. There had been direct investmentbefore that
period, particularly because of the colonial ties that existed between
countries. But, as Lipsey (1982) points out, direct investment in
foreign manufacturing came to be the characteristically American
form offoreign investment, and the twentieth century witnessed both
an increasing and predominant role ofmanufacturing withthe U.S. as
source country for. direct investment. It is only in recent years that
other industrial countries have been able to strengthen their interna-
tional direct investment position vis à vis the U.S. These recent
changes in source countries have been accompanied by important
shifts in the destination of direct investment. It is within this context
ofchangingsources anddestinationsofinternationaldirect investment
that changes in the relative position of Belgium as a host country will
be studied.
Because of the lack of detailed information, the discussion will to
some extentbe basedonfinancial data relating to balance ofpayments
* INCAP (Industry and Company Analysis Program), D.T.E.W., K.U. Leuven
7statistics and will sometimes cover all operations in addition to manu-
facturing. However, as has been repeatedly argued, these financial
flows reflect reasonably weIl the size of the underlying real transac-
tions1•
11. SOURCES AND DESTINATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
DIRECT INVESTMENT
There has been an enormous expansion of direct investment in the
postwar period. However, except for the U.K. and U.S., reliable
statistical information on these transactions in the 1950's is scarce. For
more recent periods, the United Nations Centre on Transnational
Corporations has tried to estimate the stock of direct investment for
the major industrial countries. The O.E.C.D. has presented compara-
bIe data on the corresponding net capital in- and outflows. These data
are presented in table 1 and table 2 and are graphically reproduced in
figure 1.
Table 1 shows how the U.S. and the U.K. accounted for about
70 per cent of the stock of all direct investment in 1967 but less than
60 per cent in 1976. Germany and Japan in particular have gradually
been replacing the U.K. and the U.S. as sources of foreign direct
investment over the period considered. These changes in sources can
better be observed from table 2 which shows the share of the thirteen
industrial countries in the net outward direct investment flows as they
are recordedin thebalanceofpaymentsstatistics (excludingreinvested
earnings). These figures clearly show how the European countries
have become major sources of direct investment in recent years. Note
also the remarkable performance of the Netherlands. In terms of net
outward direct investment flows, the share of the U.S. not only gra-
dually decrease over time but even became negative in 1981 and 1982.
This implies that the U.S. divested more than invested abroad. How-
ever, it should be noticed that since the figures shown in table 2 omit
retained earnings they exaggerate the decline in supply ofU.S. owned
equity funds.
Simultaneously, with the decline in importance as a source of direct
investment, the U.S. has become a major destination for directinvest-
ment. The shares oftraditionally heavy recipients such as Canada and
Australia,alongwith some oftheEuropeancountries, reducedsharply
over the most recent period. Despite these changes in sources and
destinations of direct investment Belgium's relative position as a
8foreign investor or as a recipient country has, in quantitative terms,
changed very little. However, the fact that the sources have changed
so drastically should be reflected in the structure offoreign investment
in Belgium.
TABLE 1
Stock ofdirect investment abroad ofdeveloped market economies,
by major country oforigin, 1967-1978
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, END OF
Countryoforigin 1967 1971 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978
UnitedStates 56.6 82.8 101.3 124.2 137.2 149.8 168.1
UnitedKingdom 17.5 23.7 26.9 30.8 32.1 36.8 41.1
Germany, Federal
Republicof 3.0 7.3 11.9 16.0 19.9 24.8 31.8
Japan 1.5 4.4 10.3 15.9 19.4 22.2 26.8
Switzerland 5.0 9.5 11.1 16.9 18.6 25.4 24.6
France 6.0 7.3 8.8 11.1 11.9 21.9 23.7
Canada 3.7 6.5 7.8 10.5 11.1 13.1 14.9
Netherlands 2.2 4.0 5.5 8.5 9.8 12.1 13.6
Sweden 1.7 2.4 3.0 4.4 5.0 5.6 6.0
Belgium-Luxembourg 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.6 4.8 5.4
Italy 2.1 3.0 3.2 3.3 2.9 3.1 3.3
TOTALABOVE 101.3 153.3 192.5 243.8 270.4 319.6 359.3
Allother(estimate) 4.0 5.1 6.3 15.1 16.8 9.5 10.0
GRANDTOTAL 105.3 158.4 198.8 258.9 287.2 329.1 369.3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
UnitedStates 53.8 52.3 51.0 47.8 47.6 45.5 45.5
UnitedKingdom 16.6 15.0 13.5 11.9 11.2 11.2 11.1
Germany, Federal
Republicof 2.8 4.6 6.0 6.2 6.9 7.5 8.6
Japan 1.4 2.8 5.2 6.1 6.7 6.7 7.3
Switzerland 4.8 6.0 5.6 6.5 6.5 7.7 6.7
France 5.7 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 6.7 6.4
Canada 3.5 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.0
Netherlands 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.7
Sweden 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.6
Belgium-Luxembourg 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5
Italy 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
TOTALABOVE 96.2 96.8 96.9 94.3 94.2 97.1 97.3
All other (estimate) 3.8 3.2 3.1 5.7 5.8 2.9 2.7
GRANDTOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, (published in Stop-
ford, Duning and Haberich (1980, p. xv».
9TABLE 2
Outward net direct investmentflows
(Percentage distribution among 13 countries)
1961-67 1968-73 1974-78 1979 1980 1981 1982
Canada 2.3 4.5 6.2 9.9 14.6 17.7 [-353]
UnitedStates 61.1 45.8 29.3 24.1 8.9 [-3844.1] [-8412.6]
Japan 2.4 6.7 13.0 11.1 9.4 15.3 25.2
Australië 0.7 1.4 1.6(1) 1.4 1.7 3.3
Belgium-
Luxembourg 0.3(2) 1.4 2.5 5.1 0.8 0.4 [-63]
France 6.9 5.2 7.8 7.6 12.2 14.2 15.8
Germany 7.2 12.5 17.0 17.1 16.0 13.9 18.4
Italy 3.6 3.3 2.0 2.1 2.9 4.3 5.3
Netherlands 4.4 6.8 9.6 9.0 12.8 9.9 12.4
Sweden 2.0 2.4 3.7(3) 2.4 2.5 2.6 5.0
Unit. Kingdom 8.7 9.1 9.2 9.2 16.1 18.6 10.1
Spain 0 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.8 2.9
Norway 0 0.3 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.6 1.6
(1) From 1974 to 1976 (2) From 1965 (3) From 1974 to 1977
Figures between squared brackets represent net foreign divestment capital flows and
are expressed in millions of dollars.
Source: O.E.C.D. (1981) and I.M.F., Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1982.
TABLE 3
Inward net direct investmentflows
(Percentage distribution among 13 countries)
1961-67 1968-73 1974-78 1979 1980 1981 1982
Canada 16.2 12.1 3.2 8.5 0.8 [-2.910] [-2.011]
UnitedStates 2.6 11.4 26.7 36.8 34.7 63.0 54.8
Japan 2.0 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.3 0.6 2.3
Australia 15.6 12.9 9.5(1) 7.1 1.1 1.0 1.3
Belgium-
Luxembourg 4.5(2) 6.1 9.4 5.3 7.1 4.9' 8.2
France 8.2 8.2 15.2 12.1 15.2 8.4 8.3
Germany 21.3 16.4 14.7 7.6 1.1 4.1 4.5
Italy 11.5 8.3 5.0 1.7 2.7 3.9 3.3
Netherlands 4.7 8.5 6.0 6.0 8.8 4.8 2.8
Sweden 2.4 1.7 0.5(3) 0.5 1.2 0.6 0.9
Unit. Kingdom 9.7 7.4 6.1' 4.9 18.8 0.5 3.0
Spain 2.7 3.7 3.7 6.5 6.9 5.9 9.2
Norway 0.8 1.4 4.1 1.9 0.3 2.3 1.4
(1) From 1974 to 1976 (2) From 1965 (3) From 1974 to 1977
Figures between squared brackets represent net foreign direct divestment capital
flows expressed in millions of dollars.
Source: O.E.C.D. (1981) and I.M.F., Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1982.Finally, taking into account the high rate of inflation in recent years,
figure 1 shows how thedirect investment flows must be subject to a
serious decline in real terms overthe most recent periods. This decline
and the impact of the changes in source countries on foreign invest-
ment in Belgium will be discussed in more detail in the following
paragraphs.
FIGURE 1
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Source: O.E.e.D. (1981). Updating based on statistics in I.M.F. Balance of Pay-
ments Yearbook, 1982.
11111. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BELGIUM
A. International comparison
According to table 4, which compares for the years around 1975 the
degree of participation of foreign enterprises in the manufacturing
sector of selected industrial countries, Belgium has the most foreign
controlled industry among the European countries considered. Given
that the years of reference and the definitions of direct investment
differ according to the countries considered (see, for instance, the
difference in cut-offpointswith respect to the minimum shareholdings
of equity capital) a ranking of the different countries on the basis of
table 4can onlybeconsideiedas an approxinlation. Considering these
limitations, onemayneverthelessclassify Canada, Australia, Belgium,
Germany, France, Italy and Austria as countries which are quite hea-
vily penetrated by foreign enterprises (production by foreign enterpri-
ses ~ 20 per cent of total production). Moderately penetrated coun-
tries (between 10 and 20 per cent ofproduction) are the United King-
dom, Norway andSpain, andcountrieswhich areonlyslightly penetra-
ted are Japan, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Beyond the informa-
tion given in table 4, most authors also classify the Netherlands and
Ireland as heavily penetrated countries and the United States as a
country only slightly penetrated by foreign enterprises.
Over the period 1959-82 U.S. investment accounted for about 45
percent of all foreign investment in Belgium. The average of U.S.
investment in foreign investment for all the E.E.C. countries fluctua-
ted around 40 per cent in the years for which comparable information
was available.
Given this importance of U.S. direct investment, it is interesting to
analyze the evolution ofU.S. investment in some more detail. Table 5
shows how,the bookvalue afU.S. directinvestment, orthecumulative
nominal value ofthe net assets owned by U.S. corporations, has evol-
ved over time in seleted industrial host countries. It presents, for the
start of each decade, the value of U.S. direct investment measured
relative to the total population in the different countries. With respect
to manufacturing, Belgium climbed from the fourth position in 1950
to thethirdpositionin 1980. Inspite ofits relativelydiminishingimport-
ancefor U.S. foreign investment, Canadaremainedatthefirst position
over the periods considered. With respect to total investment,
Switzerland occupied second place in 1980, which shows this country's







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.remarkable phenomenon depicted in table 5 is the rapidly increasing
importance of U.S. investment in Ireland since it became a member
of the E.E.C. in 1973. Also Japan no longer ~emained at the bottom
but by 1980 passed both Austria and Portugal, in terms of per capita
U.S. manufacturing direct investment.
Further shifts in the destinations of U.S. direct investment can be
observedfrom table 6, which for manufacturing showsthe shares held
by the different industrial countries. The evolution ofAmerican direct
investment in nominal terms is represented in figure 2. The figure
shows how American direct investment expanded rapidly after World
War II and particularly in the 1960's. However, the annual increases
in bookvalue, in real terms, must have slowed down in the 1970's with
the use ofany reasonable deflator. Theywere negative bothin nominal
and real terms in 1982, and increased by only about 3 percent in 1983.
This dramaticdampeningofgrowth inU.S. directinvestmentis mainly
due to the sluggish economie conditions in the host countries. These
conditions depressed affiliate earnings, reduced funds available for
investment, and provided U.S. companies with little incentive to
expand their operations abroad. Given the high capital costs, U.S.
parents preferred to invest in the domestic market where conditions
were improving more rapidly.
Figure 2 also shows that trade and services became increasingly
importantin US directinvestmentovertheperiodconsidered. Return-
ing to table 6, the strong increase of the E.E.C. share in US direct
investment is very remarkable. This is at the expense ofthe Canadian
share which declined drastically over the period considered. The Belg-
ian share in U.S. manufacturing investment in the E.E.C. also in-
creased from about 10 percentin 1950 to 13 percentin the mostrecent
periods. This effect is not only typical for Belgium, as the Netherlands
and Italy have also enjoyed similar beneficial effects since the creation
of the E.E.C. in 1957. The shares of these last two countries have
increased in relative terms even more than the Belgian share. The
country with the smallest increase is France. lts share in 1982 was only
about 1 per cent higher than its 1950 share. Together with Italy, and
to some extent Belgium, France's performance is also primarily res-
ponsible for the recent deterioriation of the E.E.C. share of U.S.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































American direct investment in the industrial countries:
Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan (in 109 dollars)
19Eü 1975 1970
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Source: U.S. DepartmentofCommerce, Survey ofCurrentBusiness, variousissues.
B. E.E.C. trade effects and [J.S. direct investment in Belgium
The fact that the Belgian share in U.S. direct investment increased so
rapidly in the sixties and the early seventies can to a large extent be
associat.ed with two major E.E.C. effects. Both these effects, the
market enlargement and the creation of a customs union, have sub-
stantiallyfavoured the location ofaffiliates ofU.S. enterprisesin small
countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Prior to the E.E.C.,
these countries were surrounded by relatively high tariff walls while
their small national markets made it impossible for these countries to
be important producers of specialized consumer or producer goods
(see Drèze (1960)).
As is weIl known from customs union theory, both trade creation
and trade diversion intensify intra E.E.C. trade. There is clear evi-
dence that U.S. investors have anticipated these effects and have
consequently increased their production capacity and changed their
Iocal sales and exportoperationsin the differentE.E.C. membercoun-
tries (see Scaperlanda and Balough (1983) for evide~cerelating to the
17E.E.C., and Sleuwaegen (1984a) for evidence relating to the different
member countries). To illustrate these trade effects, table 7 decompo-
ses the proportional increase in sales of manufacturing affiliates of
U.S. firms from 1957 to 1966 (éi.SS ) into a domestic sales effect
(aSD ) (aSx) - and an export sales effect - . The table shows that for
S S
Belgium and the Netherlands,9the increase in export sales was larger
than the increase in local sales. Further decomposition of the export
sales term into an export growth effect and into the initial (1957)
export sales (openess) ratio shows how, during the period considered,
export sales growth in all E.E.C. countries has been an important
factor in the rapid increase in the volume of U.S. investment in these
countries. The effect for Germany is smaller. The table also seems to
suggest that the U.S. investment boom within the E.E.C. to a large
extent has occurred at the expense of other European countries. The
figures suggest that, for most of these countries, E.F.T.A. (Spain dit
not belong to E.F.T.A.) did not fully compensate for the relative
export market losses caused by the creation ofthe E.E.C.. An excep-
tion is Sweden, which had a rapidly increasing export/sales ratio over
the period considered. Note also that the U.K.'s export/sales ratio
remained unchanged for both periods. The importance ofE.E.C. and
other European export markets for U.S. subsidiaries located in selec-
ted European countries is represented in the last two columns of table 7.
The period between 1966 and 1977 changes very little from these
observations. Table 8 shows how during this periodexportgrowthwas
less important for the large countries and the small non E.E.C.-coun-
tries than for the small E.E.C.-countries. Also the new members of
the E.E.C.: Denmark and Ireland seem now to enjoy the same trade
advantages than do the other small E.E.C. membercountries. A com-
parison of the last three columns of table 8 with the last two columns
of table 7 reveals how over the period 1966-1977 exports were less
concentrated in the original six E.E.C.'-countries, but that for most of
the European countries considered, exports to non-European coun-
tries became more important. Table 9expresses exportsby U.S. majo-
rity owned affiliates as a share of exports by all firms in seletted
industrial countries. For most of the countries these shares take on
larger values over the years considered. Not surprisingly, the small
countries such as Ireland, Belgiumand the Netherlands show very
high ratios. As to the larger European countries, exports by the U.K.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exports by U. S. Majority Owned Manufacturing Affiliates
as a Share ofExports by All Firms
1957 1966 1977
Belgium-Luxembourg .023 .094 .171
France .013 .061 .094
Germany .031 .066 .094
Italy .002 .044 .047
Netherlands .011 .084 .148
UnitedKingdom .099 .164 .166
Denmark .022 .010 .028
Ireland n.a. .125 .253
Norway .048 .028 .026
Spain .048 .028 .026
Sweden .005 .031 .031
Switzerland .046 .065 .038
Souree: U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1960, 1975, 1981).
n.a. = not available.
c. Global and sectoral evolution
In spite of the comparative tables, discussed in paragraph A, which
suggest that Belgium's relative position as a host countryfor attracting
foreign direct investment has not significantly worsened, the fact that
world direct investment has decreased in recent years implies that
Belgium receives less direct investment. This is illustrated in both
table 10 and figure 3.
It can be observed from table 10 that since 1974, the year which
showed a record amount ofplanned foreign investment (measured as
planned capital expenditures), there has been a rapid fall in new
foreign investment. Looking at the distribution according to the three
major industrial sectors, it follows that the fall is largely. explained by
the reduction in manufacturing investment, although in recent years
trade and services also display a slow-down. It is obvious that as many
observers have attributed the rapid acceleration of the economie
growth rate in Belgium in the postwar period until 1974 with the
massive entrance by foreign enterprises in the Belgian industry during
the same period (see figure 3) the recent regression of foreign invest-
ment may equally weU be associated with the recentBelgian economie
growth slowdown. A comparison ofnew investments by foreign enter-
prises with new investments by domestic enterprises in Belgium is


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Foreign direct investment in Belgium, 1959-1982: planned capital expenditures
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Source: Belgian Ministry ofEconomieAffairs, Buitenlandse Investeringen in België,
various issues.
In terms of employment created by new establishments, table 11
reveals the capital-intensive character and the rapid increase of the
capital-Iabour ratio of new foreign establishments in relation to Bel-
gian manufacturing establishments. Clearly, this evolution must be of
major concern for analyzing the rapidly growing Belgian structural
employment problem.
In spite of its recent decline in importance, foreign investment in
manufacturing still accounts for the largest share of all foreign invest-
ment. Within manufacturing, metallic fabrications and chemicals are
the most important sector for·foreign investment. This follows from
table 12, which shows that it is only in recent years thatforeign invest-
ment has become somewhat more diversified.
With respect to the share of sales held by multinational enterprises
in the different industrial sectors, Daniël Van Den Bulcke has shown







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.inated by multinational enterprises. The metals sector ranked at the
third place with 45 per cent in 1975. Figure 4 also shows how these
shares increased between 1968 and 1975 with an overall increase for
the manufacturing sector from 33 per cent in 1968 to 44 per cent in
1975. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that the shares of output
accounted for by multinational companies in the Belgian manufactu-
ring industries can bereasonablyweIl explained bytechnical efficiency
and product differentiation abilities displayed by these companies (see
Sleuwaegen (1984b)).
FIGURE 4








Source: D. Van Den Bulcke et al., (1978), p. 87.
26
"(EAR
TYPED. Analysis by country oforigin and region ofdestination offoreign
investment in Belgium
In the early 1960's, U.S. corporations must have enjoyed important
advantages vis à vis their European competitors which might explain
the U.S. direct investment boom in Europe during that period2. In
Belgium, over the period 1959-1968, 65 per cent of all foreign invest-
ment came from the United States. E.E.C. countries other than Bel-
gium accounted only for about 27 per cent of all foreign investment.
Thispatternhaschangeddrasticallysince 1968withE.E.C. investment
has becomingmore importantthan U.S. investment Germany, France
and the Netherlands were the most important E.E.C. investors, res-
pectively. However, it should also be observed from table 13 that, in
the most recent years countries other than the U.S. and the E.E.C.
countries have accountedfor an increasingshareofforeign investment
in Belgium. In spite of the increasing importance of Japanese direct
investment in total world direct investment, Japanese investment
represents, except for the years 1980 and 1981, only a small fraction
of all foreign investment in Belgium.
To properly consider the changes in sources of direct investment
described above, it is important to derive from figure 5 how these
relative changes and the regression of direct investment in Belgium
are related to the stagnation and decline of American foreign invest-
ment in recent years.
Turning to the regional destination of foreign investment, table 14
shows how in the early sixties almost eighty per cent of all foreign
investment in manufacturing went to the Flemish region, while the
other twentyper centwas destinedexclusively for theWalloonregion.
Brussels' shareofmanufacturingforeign investmentwas ofonlyminor
importance. Fromthe secondhalfofthe sixties through the late seven-
ties Wallonia has considerably improved its relative position vis à vis
Flanders. Only in the most recent years has Flanders again strengthe-
ned its position. Note also that with respect to all foreign investment,
the share ofBrusselsis considerablylargerthan when onlymanufactu-
ring is considered. This points at Brussels' attractiveness for foreign
investment in trade and services. These sectors have become more
important for foreign investment in recent years. The relatively large
share of Brussels in foreign manufacturing investment in 1981 and
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































American and all foreign direct investment in Belgium, 1959-1982
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TABLE 14
Regional distribution offoreign investment
Flanders Wallonia Brussels
Manufac- Manufac- Manufac-
turing Total turing Total turing Total
~959--1964 0.776 - 0.201 - 0.023 -
1965-1969 0.608 - 0.350 - 0.042 -
1970-1974 0.549 0.514 0.370 0.324 0.081 0.162
1975 0.356 0.335 0.644 0.487 0.0 0.178
1976 0.444 0.414 0.537 0.444 0.019 0.142
1977 0.444 0.352 0.560 0.367 0.0 0.281
1978 0.498 0.461 0.495 0.345 0.007 0.194
1979 0.837 0.800 0.131 0.106 0.032 0.094
1980 0.589 0.378 0.386 0.207 0.025 0.415
1981 0.599 0.571 0.025 0.025 0.376 0.404
1982 0.471 0.456 0.277 0.247 0.252 0.297
Source: Belgian Ministry of Economie Affairs, op. eit.
29IV. THE COMPETITIVENESS OF BELGIUM FOR ATTRACT-
ING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In past years several surveys have beenconducted to detect the factors
that were responsible for the massive entrance by foreign enterprises
in Belgian industry during the postwarperiod. Forthe periodbetween
1945 and 1968 the following factors, listed in order of decreasing
importance, showed up as predominant in the decision to invest in
Belgium3:
- the availability of a qualified labour force
- the economie infrastructure and central location of Belgium in
Europe
- the fiscal system
- the investment incentives granted by the government and the exis-
ting credit facilities.
Other factors which were listed as important included the absence of
exchange controls and the possibilitiesofrepatriatingprofits, theflexi-
bility ofthe governmentadministration in dealing with foreign invest-
ment projects, the good industrial relations and the active promotion
of location and investment incentives in Belgium.
A foll<?w up to these surveys4 for new foreign investment between
1968 and 1976 revealed the following factors as the most important
determinants:
- the centrallocation of Belgium in the E.E.C.
- the high productivity of the labour force
- the existing infrastructure and transport facilities
- the possibilities to enter the E.E.C. market and the investment
incentives granted by the Belgian government.
It is interesting to note that the possibilities to penetrate into the
E.E.C. market were much more important for U.S. investors (second
in ranking) than for E.E.C. multinationals (tenth in ranking). About
fifty per cent of the latter group considered the local Belgian market
as an important location factor.
The recently published results of a survey conducted by the Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce in 1980 also emphasized the foremen-
tioned factors as predominant in the original investment decision by
U.S. firms in Belgium5. However, the samesurvey revealedthat about
50 per cent of the manufacturing affiliates of U.S. enterprises think
30that these location conditions are no longer met, which might explain
why nearly halfofthe responding companies have considered alterna-
tive locations for all or part of their operations outside Belgium. Of
large manufacturers55 percentofthesewithmore than500 employees
have considered relocating. The following factors, in decreasing order
of concern were reasons large manufacturers actually decreased their
original expansion plans:
- unit labour costs
- excessive government regulations
- insufficient government incentives and subsidies
- labour militancy
- the Belgian social security burden.
The above list shows how the factors which were responsible for the
original investmenfplanshave now becomedecisive in boththe down-
ward revision of these plans and in the relocationand disinvestment
considerations of an important group of American companies in Bel-
gium. We shall return to this problem in the last paragraph of this
paper where we shall present statistical evidence about the size of
foreign disinvestment in Belgium.
Based upon the results of a study by the European Communities,
the concern of the U.S. investors seems to be well-founded. For 1981,
Belgium showed up with the highest absolute level of hourly labour
costs relative to its competitors (see table 15).
In order to compare unit-labour costs internationallywe should also
take into account differences in productivity among countries. These
productivity differences may beless importantfor a multinational firm
with fairly standardizedproduction techniques. However, many ofthe
listed locations factors, such as the quality of the labour force, the
industrial relations and the general economic climate, mayalso cause
substantial differences in productivity among countries. Table 16 pre-
sents for three different periods, using the first year of each period as
the baseyeartheevolutionin productiviy,compensationperemployee
andunitlabourcosts for themanufacturingsectorin selectedindustrial
countries.
Table 16 shows that Belgian labour costs increased considerably in the
sixties, but especially in the period from 1972 to 1977 the average
labour costs in Belgium increased more markedly than in several other
European countries. Taking accountofthe dollarexchange rate evolu-
tion, Belgium left behind all other industrial countries during this
31TABLE 15
























Note: Figures for Community countries relate to labour costs and include all expen-
diture borne by employers in connection with the employment ofworkers, i.e.
direct pay, bonuses, paid annualleave, benefits in kind, social security charges
paid by the employer, special levies, etc. (Source: Eurostat, 17 December
1982).
Data in brackets for certain Communities, the United States and Japan
coveringearnings andfringe benefitsaredrawn from theInstitutderDeutschen
Wirtschaft, 6 May 1982.
Source: E.E.C., European Economy, May 1983.
32TABLE 16
Evolution ofunit labour costs and their components in selected industrial countries
(1960-1982). Indices (Base year = First year of the different subperiods)
Compensationper Productivity Unit labourcosts
employee (output per
employee)
in national in dollars in national in dollars
currency currency
U.S.A.
1960-1972 179.7 179.7 147.1 121.8 121.8
1972-1977 154.4 154.4 111.8 138.3 138.3
1977-1982 155.1 155.1 103.7 149.4 149.4
Japan
1960-1972 454.3 539.5 320.7 141.5 168.0
1972-1977 210.2 277.3 131.4 160.0 180.7 I
1977-1982 126.2 136.1 123.6 102.1 110.1
Germany
1960-1972 273.6 360.4 166.4 164.8 217.1
1972-1977 163.4 224.4 123.6 132.4 181.8
1977-1982 131.3 125.6 103.3 126.9 121.4
France
1960-1972 286.8 280.7 201.3 142.7 139.7
1972-1977 202.6 208.0 121.0 167.6 172.1
1977-1982 191.2 142.9 115.9 165.0 123.4
Italy
1960-1972 338.8 362.5 185.2 182.8 195.6
1972-1977 274.7 181.6 116.8 234.6 155.1
1977-1982 225.7 147.2 117.1 192.1 125.3
Netherlands
1960-1972 327.5 387.8 177.6 183.6 217.4
1972-1977 184.2 240.9 127.5 144.6 189.1
1977-1982 136.8 125.7 118.2 115.7 106.4
Belgium
1960-1972 300.1 340.9 189.8 158.1 179.6
1972-1977 202.1 248.2 134.2 150.6 184.9
1977-1982 143.6 112.7 124.5 115.4 90.5
United
Kingdom
1960-1972 245.5 219.0 146.9 168.0 149.8
1972-1977 239.1 167.0 113.4 210.8 147.2
1977-1982 194.0 194.4 109.2 178.1 178.5
Denmark
1960-1972 322.1 320.1 178.9 179.6 178.5
1972-1977 202.9 234.9 129.9 156.3 180.9
1977-1982 168.9 121.7 120.9 139.4 100.4
Ireland
1960-1972 341.4 304.5 161.5 211.6 188.7
1972-1977 243.2 169.9 112.4 216.2 151.0
1977-1982 211.7 172.2 122.4 173.1 140.8
Source: E.E.C. European Economy, May 1983, and own calculations.period. It is only in the most recent period that Belgian labour costs
have evolved more favourably. The depreciation ofthe dollar relative
to the currencies of most of the other countries over the period 1977-
1982 reinforcesthisfavourable evolution. Withrespecttoproductivity,
table 16 shows that Belgium performed considerably better than all
other countries over all periods, except for the remarkable perfor-
mance of Japan during the sixties. However, the E.E.C. study points
out that the rapiá growth of Belgian productivity over the past few
years was due principally to a substantial fall in employment rather
than to large increases in output. This implies that the loss in capacity
has done little to improve the overall position of the rest of industry.
Together with the evolution in the different components, one may
observe that the favourable evolutionin productivity has beenrespon-
sibie for the more modest increases of unit labour costs in Belgian
manufacturing. In the most recent period Belgian unit labour costs
expressed in dollars actually decreased. This recent evolution seems
to have compensated for much of the loss in competitiveness that
Belgium has suffered in previous periods vis à vis other European
countries such as France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
It has been shown that U.S. direct investment in Belgium, as in
other small European countries, is highly sensitive to changes in the
competitive positions of the country (Sleuwagen (1984a)). One can
also expect that the recentfavourable evolution ofBelgium's competi-
tiveness will again strengthen its relative position as a host country for
foreign direct investment.
v. DISINVESTMENT DECISIONS BY MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
Since the beginning ofthe economiecrisis in 1974 many host countries
have not only been confronted with the problem of the regression in
new foreign investment but also with the phenomenon of disinvest-
ment. The meaning of foreign .disinvestment is that multina~ional
enterprises close down part of, or all of their production plants in a
particular country. Table 20 depiets the size of foreign disinvestment
in Belgium in terms of number of plants closed down, in terms ofthe
size of the original investment plans of the production plants closed
down, and in terms of employment lost.
34TABLE 17
Foreign disinvestment in Belgium (1965-1981)
Period Numberofplants Capitaldisinvestment Employmentlosses
closeddown
# %(a) Millions % (b) Millions % (b) # % (c)
ofBF ofBF
1965-1969 14 3.95 567 0.88 552 0.97 1,670 5.54
1970-1974 53 14.44 2,697 4.72 2,361 6.19 3,830 15.08
1975-1979 109 61.93 5,472 14.93 4,297 23.37 8,689 114.21
1980-1982 28 59.58 13,226 86.38 n.a. n.a. 2,121 104.13
1965-1982 204 21.62 21,962 12.67 n.a. n.a. 16,310 35.91
(a) As a per cent of total number of new establishments in the periods considered.
(b) As a per cent of new foreign investmenfprojects in the subperiods.
(c) As a per cent of planned employment creation by new foreign firms in the diffe-
rent periods.
Souree: E. Halsberghe and D. Van DenBulcke (1982), p. 2. Updatingfrom Ministry
ofEconomieAffairs, BuitenlandseInvesteringenin België,Jaarverslag 1982.
The total number ofplants closed between 1965 and 1982 was 204. In
terms of new establishments during the same period this represents
about twenty per cent. This ratio increased rapidly in the last two
periods to a level of about 60 per cent. A similar picture emerges for
disinvestment measured in terms of the original investment plans for
the closed plants relative to planned investment by new foreign firms
in the different subperiods. However, thelast measure underestimates
the actual size of disinvestment by not taking account ofthe capital
goods price evolution. Expressing disinvestment and new investment
in constant 1963 prices corrects for this bias. Unfortunately, this infor-
mation was not available for the most recent periode The actual size
ofdisinvestment can also be measured in terms ofemploymentlosses.
Given the evolution of the capital-Iabour ratio in the most recent
periods, the disinvestment ratio, computed as the loss ofemployment
relative to created employment by new foreign establishments, shows
the most spectacular increase and points also at the real dimensions of
the disinvestment problem.
A study by Martine Feron (1981) shows that the bulk ofall foreign
disinvestment over the period 1965-1979 was concentrated in two sec-
tors: metals (45
%
) and textiles (27
%
). During this period about fifty
per cent of all disinvestment was accounted for by American enter-
prises. E.E.C. enterprises accounted for about one third, with the
35United Kingdom and the Netherlands as the most important disinves-
tors ofthis group. Fromtheregional pointofview, Liège sufferedmost
from disinvestment in relation to new foreign investment during this
periode Based upon this relative measure, Antwerp displayed the best
score with 30 per cent of all new investment and only 13.5 per cent of
all disinvestment in Belgium during this periode Recently, the trend in
disinvestment in the province ofLimbourghas also becomevery disfa-
vourable, and takes on very large proportions in relation to new plan-
ned foreign investment in the province (about 58 per cent during the
period 1975-1979). With respect tothelinguisticregions, Walloniawas
in the worse position. lt accounted for 38.5 per cent ofall new foreign
investment in Belgium, and 58.3 per cent of all foreign disinvestment.
This contrasts with the situation in Flanders which had 56 per cent of
all new foreign investment and only 41.5 per cent of all foreign disin-
vestment. From these figures it follows that Brussels did not have
important disinvestments over the period 1965-1979.
Based upon the statistics collected by the "Fund for the compensa-
tion of employees laid off because of closures offirms" Erik Halsber-
ghe and Daniel Van Den Bulcke (1982) analyzed the size of foreign
disinvestments in relation to disinvestments by domestic firms6. They
found that for the period between 1960 and mid-1977 the number of
employees laid-off because of disinvestments amountèd to 107.378,
with 20 per cent ofthis total due to foreign disinvestments. However,
over the period between 1975 and 1981, the number offoreign estab-
lishments closed down as a per cent of total number of foreign estab-
lishments exceeded a similar ratio for domestic firms by about 4 per
cent (23,12% versus 19,41%, respectively).
TABLE 18
Employment losses due to disinvestment in Belgium (1975-1981)
Period Belgian companies Foreign companies Total
N(a) 0/0 (b) N(a) 0/0 (b) N(a)
1975-1976 22,811 4.53 10,762 3.24 33,573
1977-1978 18,065 3.59 6,665 2.01 24,730
1979-1980 15,112 3.00 4,809 1.45 19,921
1981 7,490 1.49 3,621 1.09 11,111
TOTAL 63,478 12.62 25,857 7.81 89,335
(a) Number of employees laid-off
(b) As a per cent of the 1975 employment in Belgian and foreign companies.
Souree: A. Halsberghe and D. Van Den Bulcke (1982), p. 7.
36Over the period 1975-1981, employment reductions due to disinvest-
ments by domestic enterprises were 12.62 per cent of 1975 employ-
ment (tabie 21). The corresponding figure is only 7.81 per cent for
affiliates of foreign enterprises. The difference in the relative magni-
tude of disinvestment in terms of number of disinvestments and in
terms of the size of employment losses between domestic firms and
foreign affiliates has undoubtedlymuch to do with thecapital intensive
technology which characterizes foreign investments in Belgium (see
also table 11).
Table 19 shows how foreign disinvestments were distributed accord-
ing to the countries of origin over the period 1968-1981. The table
illustrates that U.S. disinvestments have become more important in
recent periods. From the E.E.C. countries, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom displayed the highest score over the period 1968-
1975. The Dutch disinvestments were closely related to the sectoral
concentration of disinvestment in Belgium in textiles while, as Hals-
berghe and. Van Den Bulcke (1982) pointed out, the British disinvest-
ments are closely related to the reorientation of British investments
due to Britain's entrance into the E.E.C. French disinvestments have
also become very important in recent periods. This contrasts with
German disinvestments whose evolution went in the other direction
and which were relatively unimportant in all the periods considered.
As to the sectoral mix, recent disinvestments by multinational enter-
prises and domestic disinvestments, expressed as a percentage of the
total number of disinvestments, were distributed very similarly: texti-
les 31% and 36
%
, metals 30% and 31% and food products 9% and
12% for domestic and multinational firms, respectively (over the
period 1975-1981).
The files of the Fund from which the previous tables were derived
also contain data on the reasons for the disinvestment decisions.
Table 20 shows thatbankcruptcy as a closure reason-is moreimportant
for domesticfirms thanfor foreign firms. Thelattergroupoffirms stop
their activities more for economic reasons (market conditions, econo-
mic climate) than do domestic firms. Although no precise definition is
given for theseeconomicreasons,itmaybeacceptedthatthesereasons
are closely related to the lo.cation conditions listed in par~graph IV
and are more the subjectofan active reorganization policy ofthe firm.
This evidence on the marked difference in disinvestment behaviour
between multinational enterprises and domestic enterprises is comple-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reasansfor closures by domestsic andforeign enterprises (in per cents)
Reason 1975-1976 1977-1978 1979-1981
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
enter- enter- enter- enter- enter- enter-
prises prises prises prises prises prises
Bankruptcy 64 41 77 33 83 49
Economie
reasons 10 27 15 57 10 37
luridical
Agreement 26 32 2 1 10 1
Liquidation - 6 9 6 12
Otherreasons - 0.4 0.2 1
Numberof
enterprises 555 105 487 69 622 74
Souree: E. Halsberghe and D. Van Den Bulcke (1982), p. 13.
These considerations imply that multinational enterprises face higher
opportunity costs than domestic firms when the economic conditions
worsen in a particular country. Multinationals can easily serve the
market in that country through exports from plants located in other,
more location competitive, countries where they may use the capacity
more intensively. For domestic firms without foreign production
plants, no such easy relocation possibilities exist in the short run.
Given the high costs of setting up an international network, it is often
more optimal for domestic firms to continue to operate in the country
until material, labour and capital costs are no longer met and bank-
ruptcy occurs.
To conclude this discussion on foreign disinvestment, it is useful to
compare theBelgian situationwith the trendsin disinvestmentin some
other countries. The comparison thatwill bemade is based on balance
of payments statistics on direct investment. These data are subject to
serious limitations due to the fact that they do not take account of
reinvested earnings and local capital provisions. Moreover, the direct
investment figures contain loans made by parents to affiliates, which
implies that the reimbursements ofthese loans are considered as disin-
vestments. Aside from this problem, the data on disinvestment repre-
sent all closures of affiliates by multinational enterprises or all reduc-
tions in capitalof affiliates, such that the degree of participation in
equity capital falls below 20 per cent or 10 per cent (according to the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 21 also presents data on inward gross direct investment flows
in orderto obtain a relative measure ofthe magnitude ofthe disinvest-
ments. In the period 1967-1975, disinvestment amounted to almost 30 .
per cent of all direct investment in the E.E.C. countries. The same
ratio rose much higher in the last period with a peak of44 per cent in
1979. The share ofBelgium in gross direct investmentinflows changed
very little in the most recent periods. This contrasts sharply with the
disfavourable evolutions of the German and Italian shares. With res-
pect to disinvestment, the Belgian share increased somewhat in the
most recent periods, but in relation to new gross investment, Belgium
still scores better than all other E.E.C. countries. The shares of Ger-
many and the Netherlands in foreign disinvestment in the E.E.C.
remain high over the whole periode Remarkable phenomena for the
period 1976-81 were the favourable evolution ofthe Italian share and
theoppositemovementoftheFrenchshareinforeign disinvestment.
A disaggregation of table 2 according to the ba,se countries of the
in- or di-vesting companies revealed that the Belgian share in Ameri-
can disinvestment,which was very low for the period 1967-1975, in-
creased very rapidly in the most recent periods. This, together with
the decline in New American direct investment, has become a serious
matter of concern for the Belgian industrial policy makers?
To conclude, the table reproduced in this section shows that foreign
disinvestinent is not a problem unique to Belgium. Judging from the
balance ofpayments statistics, the Belgian situation is often even bet-
ter than the situation in other E.E.C. countries. However, the recent
unfavourable evolution of American direct investment and disinvest-
ment in ~elgium needs to be closely followed for its future implica-
tions.
VI. SUMMARY
Foreign direct investment flows have evolved less spectacularly in
recent periods than was the case in the sixties. They even decreased
both in nominal and real terms in the most recent years. The recent
trends have been accompanied by important changes in both source
and destination countries. Within these recent changes, the in- and
outflows ofdirect investment between E.E.C. countries and the U.S.
have become more balanced. AIso, Japan has become an important
source country in the most recent periods.
41Belgium is an important recipient country for direct investment.
Measuredin termsoftheshareofmanufacturingsales heldbyaffiliates
of multinational enterprises, Belgium, with a share of 0.44 in 1975,
belongs to the group ofcountries which are the most heavily penetra-
ted. With respect to U.S. manufacturing direct investment per capita,
Belgium ranked thirdplace afterCanadaandIrelandamongthe group
of all industial countries, in 1980.
In spite ofthe fact thatthe relative positionofBelgium amongother
industrial countries has not significantly worsened in recent times, the
.general slowdownofforeign directinvestment, andespeciallyofAme-
rican investment, causes an important problem for Belgian industry.
The increasing importance of E.E.C. direct investment is not able to
fully compensate for these losses.
Direct investment in Belgium is still heavily concentrated in metals
andchemicais, buttogetherwith the relative decline in theimportance
of the manufacturing sector, the industrial structure offoreign invest-
menthas become somewhat more diversified in recent years.
From the regional point of view, Flanders has somewhat recently
regained its strong position which was characteristic of the develop-
ment offoreign direct investmentin Belgian manufacturingduringthe
sixties. Flanders lost much its strong position in the seventies. These
movements were offset by opposite movements in the share held by
Wallonia. Especially with the increasing importance of trade and
services in foreign direct investment, the position ofBrussels conside-
rably improved with respect to all new foreign investment in Belgium
during the most recent periods.
. Many American enterprises think that the locations factors which
favoured Belgium as location site in the sixties are no longer met.
Among these factors, American investors ranked the high unit labour
cost as the major disfavourable factorin Belgium. Evidence collected
by the E.E.C. shows that for 1981 Belgium had the highest average
hourly labour costs relative to a large group of industrial countries.
This same E.E.C. study however, also shows that in the past, Belgian
productivity rose more rapidly than in the other countries, and that in
the most recent period, bothcompensationper employee and produc-
tivity had the most favourable evolution for Belgium's competitive
position vis à vis the other industrial countries.
The dissatisfaction of foreign investors may explain the important
number of foreign disinvestments in Belgium. Although the number
ofdisinvestments was higher for foreign firms than for domesticfirms,
42the loss in employment was significantly Iess for the group offoreign
firms. This undoubtedly has much' to do with the capital intensive
technology used by foreign firms. With respect to the causes ofdisin-
vestment, it was found that foreign investors chose to close down
plants more for location reasons than do Belgian firms, which often
have no better option than to stay in business until bankruptcy. When
location·conditions worsen in Belgium, the opportunity costs of the
Belgian plants become too high relative to the multinationals' opera-
tions in other countries. This may explain the important international
relocation decisions by these firms.
The important number and size of American disinvestments in the
most recent periods have become a serious matter of concern for
Belgian industrial policymakers. However, foreign disinvestment is
not a phenomenon unique to Belgium. Judged from balance of pay-
ments statistics andin comparisonwith thesix originalE.E.C.member
countries, Belgium scores best with the lowest foreign disinvestmentl
investment ratio.
NOTES
1. In a strict sense the term direct investment is defined as international capital flows
to firms in which the foreign investor has a controlling participation. However,
because foreign direct investments are chiefly, if not exclusively, undertaken by
multinational enterprises, most authors have used the termto cover the operations
by thesefirms. Inthetext, various datasources coveringdifferentdirectinvestment
variables ae used. The most important sources and corresponding variables are:
United States Department of Commerce: Book value of U.S. direct investment
abroad, defined as net worthplus liabilities allocated to U.S. investors in the
balance sheets of firms in which U.S. investors own at least 10% of the voting
shares.
Organisation ofEconomie Cooperation and Development,
International Monetary Fund, Eurostat: Capital-in and outflows recorded in the
balances of payments as direct investment.
Belgian Ministry ofEconomie Affairs: Capital (Property, Plant and Equipment)
expenditures by foreign-owned enterprises in Belgium.
2. For an analysis of these advantages, see Sleuwaegen (1984a).
3. D. Van Den Bulcke (1975), pp. 79-87.
4. F. Haex, E. Halsberghe, D. Van Den Bulcke (1978), pp. 95-99.
5. American Chamber ofCommerce in Belgium, 1980. Survey ofAmerican Compa-
nies in Belgium, Brussels, 1980.
6. The official Dutch name is "Fonds tot vergoeding van de in geval van shiiting van
ondernemingen getroffen werknemers". Accordingto this fund a closure by a firm
is defined as a fall in the number of employees with 75 per cent or more of total
employment in the previous year.
7. An analysis of the tables for different groups of countries is given in Sleuwaegen
(1984c).
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